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RECENT DECISIONS
Administrative

Law-INCOMPLETED TITLE VII ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS NOT TERMINATED BY JUDICIAL REVIEW-FEDERAL EMPLOYEE MAY PRES-

ENT NEW EVIDENCE IN

CouRT-Grubbs v. Butz, 514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir.

1975).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 19721 (EEOA) extended
certain provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 to federal
employees. One such provision extended is contained in § 717(c) . Under
this section a federal employee alleging employment discrimination is

granted access to a United States district court in two situations: when
administrative relief is not provided within 180 days after the filing of the
original complaint; or, upon final action being taken by either the agency
involved or the Civil Service Commission.' Where final administrative
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974). For a discussion of this Act see Sape & Hart, Title
WI Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
824 (1972).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
3. Section 717(c) of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA) (42 U.S.C.A. §
2000e-16(c) (1974)) provides:
Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency,
...or by the Civil Service Commission ... or after one hundred and eighty days
from the filing of the initial charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the
Civil Service Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department,
agency, or unit. . an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final
disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint,
may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action
the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant.
4. Traditionally the courts have been reluctant to interfere with federal employment standards. Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (D.D.C. 1973). This was because the
government could always claim sovereign immunity. In recent decades the review of adverse
actions taken by the Civil Service Commission has broadened from a review insuring statutory compliance, see, e.g. Boylan v. Quarles, 235 F.2d 834 (D.C. Cir. 1956), to a review based
on finding substantial support for the administrative findings, see, e.g., Halsey v. Nitze, 390
F.2d 142, 144 (4th Cir. 1968). The scope of review has broadened but it has still remained a
review of the administrative record rather than a trial de novo.
Since the enactment of the EEOA, federal employees have generally been denied independent jurisdiction on grounds other than Title VII. The federal employee has been denied the
right to file an independent civil action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (§ 1981)
because the government has retained the right of sovereign immunity in that area. See, e.g.,
McLaughlin v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 885, 892 (S.D. Ala. 1974). The fifth amendment has
not been seen as a ground for independent action since the employee can gain relief for any
fifth amendment violation through a Title VII action. Id. at 892-93. The mandamus provided
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 has generally been denied as an independent basis for jurisdiction.
This statute compels public officials to perform their ministerial duties, e.g., the duty not to
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action has been taken, decisions differ as to whether new evidence should
be allowed in the district court (trial de novo), or whether the civil action
should be limited to a review of the administrative record. The Supreme
Court has determined that private employees have a right to a trial de
novo,5 but this right has infrequently been granted to public employees.'
discriminate. However, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which is normally not utilized
when another remedy is available, such as a Title VII action. Id. at 893. Although federal
employees have frequently sought a trial de novo by an independent cause of action, this has
generally been denied.
This denial of a trial de novo has put the federal employee at a disadvantage when compared to the private employee. The private employee has the initial option of filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or filing a civil action
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which is a de novo trial because there is obviously
no record to review at that point. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 450 F.2d 796 (6th
Cir. 1971); cf., Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). If he chooses to
proceed through the EEOC route, the EEOC may file a civil action on his behalf or, if the
employee is not satisfied with the EEOC resolution, he may file a civil action himself and
receive a trial de novo. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1974). This gives the private employee
three opportunities for a full trial whereas the federal employee may not receive a full trial
at any stage but only a review of the administrative proceedings. The line of cases following
Hackley denies that any inequality is created because the public employee has the benefit of
a hearing before the Civil Service Commission. See note 6 infra.
5. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court stated that the
EEOA does not restrict a private employee's right to sue to those charges for which the EEOC
has found reasonable cause. The employee also must be allowed to introduce new evidence.
Id. at 798-804. In reaching this decision the Court cited a Fourth Circuit case that noted: "The
Courts of Appeals which have considered the issue have held that court actions under Title
VII are de novo proceedings.
... Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir.
1971). The Fourth Circuit then upheld de novo proceedings for employees in the private
sector.
6. The statute itself does not mention the scope of review. It incorporates the sections of
the Code giving private sector employees the right to a trial de novo (see note 5 supra) into
the section pertaining to federal employees, but only "as applicable." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e16(d) (1974). What is meant by the term "as applicable" is not explained in either the statute
or the legislative history. Baca v. Butz, 376 F. Supp. 1005 (D.N.M. 1974), stated that there
is no automatic right to a trial de novo, partly because it read "as applicable" to mean that
sections referring to the EEOC would not be incorporated since federal employees have
available to them the Civil Service Commission. Id. at 1009. On the other hand, the phrase
could mean to substitute the Civil Service Commission as applicable in place of the EEOC.
Courts favoring a new trial generally just ignore subsection 16(d) and stress subsection 16(c)
(see note 3 supra) which gives federal employees the right to file a civil action as provided in
the section for private employees. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
379 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
Due to the ambiguity in the statute, the legislative history also must be examined. This is
a matter of dispute. Senator Williams and Senator Cranston were sponsors of the Senate
version of the EEOA, yet they disagreed in their interpretations of whether federal employees
are entitled to a trial de novo. Senator Williams interpreted the Act as providing a simple
review of the agency or Civil Service Commission proceedings. 118 CONG. REc. 2280 (daily
ed. Feb. 22, 1972). Due to an error, Senator Cranston originally appeared to agree with
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This different treatment can be attributed in part to the added protection
granted federal employees by the existence of the Civil Service Commis7
sion .
A recent case, Grubbs v. Butz,' involved judicial review of an administrative process which was begun but not completed. Ms. Grubbs, an employee of the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) of the Department of
Agriculture, filed a formal complaint with FNS alleging sex discrimination. After a six month investigation, FNS held that no evidence of sex
discrimination was established, whereupon Ms. Grubbs indicated her intention to seek a hearing within the Department of Agriculture. After a
delay of over two years, no final action had been taken by the Department.9
Ms. Grubbs filed a civil action seeking relief under the anti-discrimination
5
provisions of the EEOA1
and an injunction prohibiting the Department of
Agriculture from continuing separate administrative proceedings. The
lower court denied the injunction and, at the same time, the trial judge
held that Ms. Grubbs would have to exhaust her administrative remedies
within the Department."
Senator Williams. However, he later corrected himself, stating that the Act provides federal
employees with the right to a trial de novo. His original remarks in 118 CONG. REc. 2287 (daily
ed. Feb. 22, 1972) were corrected in 118 CONG. REC. 4929 (1972) (remarks of Senator Cranston).
As stressed by Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1973), it was the House
version and not the Senate version of the Act that was adopted. Id. at 148. The House report
strongly suggested that a trial de novo is required where it encourages "a vigorous effort to
afford Federal employees the same rights and impartial treatment which the law seeks to
afford employees in the private sector." 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2158 (1972).
Yet this quote cannot be taken too literally since private and public employees were
definitely not given the same rights. The federal employees have the benefit of an employee
oriented Civil Service Commission whereas the private employees have the EEOC which as
a conciliatory body is much weaker than the Civil Service Commission. Since Congress did
not clearly require nor clearly deny a trial de novo, the best solution would be to make the
determination on a case by case basis. See 123 U. PA. L. REv. 206 (1974); Comment, Federal
Employment Discriminationand The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972: Review
on the Administrative Record or Trial De Novo, 20 S.D.L. REv. 181 (1975).

7. See, e.g., Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (D.D.C. 1973).
8. 514 F.2d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
9. While a hearing before the Department of Agriculture was pending, Ms. Grubbs
brought an action before the Civil Service Commission (CSC) alleging that she had received
a reduction in rank from the FNS while her complaint was pending. The CSC found against
Ms. Grubbs and on May 4, 1973, she filed an action in the district court. Over two years had
passed since she initiated proceedings with FNS, and it was not until a month later, June of
1973, that she was informed that the Department of Agriculture would conduct a hearing.
Id.
10. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
11. 514 F.2d at 1327.
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Upon appeal, Chief Judge Bazelon held that under § 717(c) there was
no requirement of remedy exhaustion. 2 He stated further that to graft such
a requirement would frustrate the congressional intent of prompt access
to courts in discrimination disputes.' 3 However, the denial by the trial
court of the injunction prohibiting the Department of Agriculture from
proceeding concurrently with the plaintiff's civil action was affirmed.
Judge Bazelon noted that nothing in the Act supported the position that
concurrent proceedings were prohibited; in fact, the regulations adopted
to implement the EEOA clearly state the contrary.' 4 The court also ruled
that in deciding federal employees' Title VII claims, the district court may
not rely upon the record of incomplete administrative proceedings without
giving the employee a full and fair opportunity to present his own evidence
in court.'"
In cases dealing with the scope of review of federal employment discrimination administrative proceedings, Hackley v. Johnson" has been the most
frequently cited decision. In that case the district court held that the
EEOA does not require an automatic trial de novo for federal employees
where the administrative record is complete. However, the court must
examine the record with great care, and if the absence of discrimination is
not affirmatively established by the clear weight of the evidence, new
evidence may be allowed at the discretion of the court." Hackley further
stated that courts are free to act on a case by case basis, deciding whatever
is appropriate and consistent with experience and precedent.'" A majority
of courts have followed Hackley and have denied a new trial" while a few
12. Even before § 717(c) was enacted, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine was not always
enforced strictly. In McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969), the Court stated that
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine is subject to many exceptions and an application to a
particular case requires an understanding of the particular administrative scheme involved.
Since the passage of § 717(c), as stated in Grubbs: "[N]o appellate court has yet superimposed an exhaustion requirement on the statutory prerequisites to suit as set out in § 717(c)."
514 F.2d at 1328. In the Fourth Circuit the exhaustion of administrative remedies may be
excused where there is not available a "reasonably expeditious . . . administrative remedy."
Farley v. Turner, 281 F.2d 131, 132 (4th Cir. 1960).
13. 514 F.2d at 1328.
14. 5 C.F.R. § 713.283 (1975) provides: "The filing of a civil action [for employment
discrimination] by an employee or applicant does not terminate agency processing of a
complaint .. "
15. 514 F.2d at 1330-31.
16. 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973).
17. Id. at 1252.
18. Id.

19. See, e.g., Salone v. United States, 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975) (no circuit court other
than the District of Columbia has mandated an automatic trial de novo); Thompson v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Spencer v. Schlesinger,
374 F. Supp. 840 (D.D.C. 1974); Handy v. Gayler, 364 F. Supp. 676 (D. Md. 1973).
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cases have mandated an automatic trial de novo.20
The line of cases following Hackley has raised three basic policy considerations against granting a new trial: first, because matter already established in the record will have to be reestablished, an evidentiary trial will
overburden the courts with unnecessary duplication; 2' second, the time
required to gather new information will needlessly delay the termination
of the case;22 and third, a new trial will undermine the expertise of administrative bodies because it may be difficult for courts "to differentiate between pure discrimination claims and the underlying intricacies of civil
20. See Henderson v. Defense Contract Admin. Serv. Region, 370 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Jackson v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 379 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
Reynolds v. Wise, 375 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Tex. 1973); Griffin v. United States Postal Serv.,
7 F.E.P. Cases 303 (1973); Williams v. Mumford, 6 F.E.P. Cases 483 (1973) (mandated trial
de novo but only for matters in original complaint). These cases rely on the ambiguous statutory and legislative history, and do not deal with the policy considerations against an automatic trial de novo.
Various courts which have denied a trial de novo have stated in dictum that full trials
would naturally be allowed when there is no administrative record to review. See Spencer v.
Schlesinger, 374 F. Supp. 840, 845 (D.D.C. 1974); Baca v. Butz, 376 F. Supp. 1005, 1009-10
(D.N.M. 1974); Pointer v. Sampson, 62 F.R.D. 689, 694 n.30 (D.D.C. 1974). For a case
allowing a trial de novo only because the record was unclear see McLaughlin v. Callaway,
382 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Ala. 1974).
21. Courts, already overburdened, wish to avoid unnecessary evidentiary hearings. On the
other hand, the EEOA has strengthened the Civil Service Commission. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e16(b) (1974). If courts ignored the findings and evidence obtained by the agencies, it would
render the Commission's work almost useless.
However, there are arguments that can be made against a simple review. 5 C.F.R. §
713.218(c)(2) (1975) provides that rules of evidence will not be strictly applied in administrative hearings. The problem then exists that improper evidence may be included, and proper
evidence may be excluded. Section 713.218(e) enables the agencies to request the testimony
of federal employees but no provisions are made for obtaining the testimony of former employees. Thus a former employee's testimony, no matter how important, could not be obtained, while in a civil action the testimony of such a witness could be obtained. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 26-37. The complaints examiner in an administrative hearing is not required to
have legal experience. 5 C.F.R. § 771.116(c) (1975). In a civil action the employee controls
his own factfinding process whereas in the agency hearing the complaints officer conducts
the investigation. Id. § 713.216(a). Requiring a trial de novo in every case could burden
the courts unnecessarily, but the possible inadequacies of the administrative process may
make a trial de novo necessary in certain situations. A discretionary right of review would
provide a remedy for such a situation. See generally 123 U. PA. L. REv. 206 (1974); Comment,
FederalEmployment Discriminationand The Equal Employment OpportunityAct of 1972:
Review on the Administrative Record or Trial De Novo, 20 S.D.L. Rv. 181 (1975).
22. See Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.D.C. 1973). This is a valid argument against a full trial following a completed administrative record, but there may be
circumstances in which the administrative hearing is inadequate and a trial de novo should
be allowed. See note 21 supra. Congress did not intend a speedy process at the expense of
justice.
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service regulations governing job qualification selection for promotion,
training and the like." According to the authority expounding these considerations, a trial de novo, when dealing with federal employees, is impractical. According to those decisions, the solution is to leave the complainant to his remedy with the Civil Service Commission and for the
courts merely to provide a simple review. The Commission, it is argued,
has been greatly strengthened by Congress and is better equipped to decide
these matters. 4
The above policy considerations, however, do not apply to the situation
presented in Grubbs where no final administrative action has been taken.
The consideration of unnecessary duplication does not apply because any
evidence obtained in a new trial will be a necessary supplement to the
incomplete administrative record. Also, the time required for an evidentiary trial will not needlessly delay the final termination of the case since
there is an obvious need to gather new information which outweighs the
effect of any possible delay. In fact, the result of the decision could be to
speed up administrative proceedings.2 The last consideration, that a new
trial would undermine the expertise of administrative bodies, also does not
apply because the holding only requires a trial de novo when the agencies
themselves have not acted within the statutory time limit. Any possible
undermining can be avoided by completing the administrative process
within 180 days.
All considerations point to the wisdom of the decision to allow a full trial.
However, the court in Grubbs went further than merely permitting a trial
de novo. The court mandated that new evidence must always be allowed
when the record is incomplete. 26 The court reasoned that this is necessary
for two reasons. One reason is that a claimant, forced to proceed in two
fora at the same time, might feel it necessary to refrain from filing until
the administrative proceeding is advantageously terminated in case the
judge should decide not to allow new evidence. This would negate the
EEOA's provision for judicial relief after 180 days.2 7 The second reason is
that if the trial judge is allowed to rely heavily on the administrative
record, he may be tempted to delay until the administrative proceedings
are completed, thereby violating the clear intent of the EEOA that judicial
proceedings "be in every way expedited".2
23. Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.D.C. 1973).
24. Id.
25. The administrative bodies will want to complete the proceedings in 180 days to provide
the court with a complete record.
26. 514 F.2d at 1330-31.
27. See note 3 supra.
28. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(5) (1974).
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These are valid arguments, but they ignore the possibility that federal
employees might delay their administrative proceedings until the 180 day
period is over in order to ensure themselves a trial de novo. This would
result in needless delay and a mockery of the administrative process established by the EEOA. An employee might file a complaint and then completely ignore the administrative body. This is not what Congress intended
when § 717(c) was enacted. A possible alternative would be to give the
federal employee the right to an evidentiary trial after administrative proceedings over 180 days but make granting this trial discretionary with the
court. This would be in accord with the numerous decisions following
Hackley that neither automatically deny nor require a trial de novo. 9 If
the court feels the employee has delayed obtaining a trial de novo, the
court may deny such a trial and base its decision on the record rendered
after the 180 days. To prevent judges from arbitrarily abusing their discretion, substantial evidence that the federal employee intentionally delayed
the administrative hearings should be required. This would assure the
employee, if he did not purposely delay, a plenary review allowing him to
concentrate on the judicial process.
The increasing number of federal agencies and employees and the likelihood that employee Title VII claims will become more frequent will impose
a greater burden on administrative bodies. This will create delays in which
the 180 day limit will increasingly be surpassed and the employee will
increasingly be faced with litigation in two fora. To help remedy such a
situation, a trial de novo should be allowed at the discretion of the court.
This procedural device not only fulfills the congressional purpose that the
EEOA provide for an expeditious hearing while protecting the rights of
federal employees but also avoids the duplication criticized by the Hack ley
line of cases.
M.J.W.
29. Although the cases following Hackley generally deny a trial de novo, they do admit that
exceptions may exist. See note 20 supra. Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247, 1252 (D.D.C.
1973).

